Positive network effects arise where incremental product use increases the utility of users of compatible products (user-positive effects), but also in situations where product use imposes negative externalities that selectively affect the adopters of incompatible alternatives (nonuser-negative effects). This paper compares the social optimality of firms' incentives for compatibility under these two regimes. Using a "location" model of differentiated products, I find that, under both regimes, incentives for unilateral action to increase compatibility tend to be suboptimal when firms' networks are close in size, but they may be excessive for small firms when networks differ greatly in size. The result is consistent with prior analysis of the user-positive context (e.g., Katz & Shapiro, 1985), but challenges the intuition that activities involving negative externalities are always oversupplied in an unregulated market. Public policy implications are discussed.
derived. A number of theoretical papers have found that profit-maximization-based decisions on who to extend compatibility to, and how fully, do not generally lead to socially optimal outcomes (Katz & Shapiro, 1985 , 1986 Economides & Flyer, 1998; Church & Gandal, 2000; Malueg & Schwartz, 2006; Casadesus-Masanell & Ruiz-Aliseda, 2009 ).
In markets involving nonuser-negative effects, compatibility comes into play just as it does with user-positive effects. When a consumer considers whether to use a selective-externality-imposing product or some alternative, she typically considers how well or badly the alternative will fare in terms of its relationship to the imposing product and how many units of the imposing product there are in use. For example, the prospective buyer of a car might wonder how well she will make out if she collides with an SUV, and how many SUVs she is likely to encounter on the road. The first question has to do with compatibility, and the second with the size of the relevant installed base (Note 4).
A key strategic question facing the manufacturer in this context is how large to make the selective negative externality. That is, how incompatible should the product be with competing products (Note 5)? For example, the manufacturers of SUVs must consider how dangerous to make their vehicles to the occupants of cars. The question of the social optimality of firms' incentives for compatibility in this case seems to have a trivially obvious answer. Because incompatibility directly increases relative preference through the IYCBEJE bandwagon, intuition suggests that private incentives for incompatibility would always be excessive. Public policy, one expects, could unambiguously improve welfare by reducing incompatibility at the margin. This paper compares incentives for compatibility under user-positive and nonuser-negative network effects regimes and looks at both relative to the social optimum. I analyze a "location" model of differentiated products. In this sense, the approach is similar to the analyses of network externalities offered by Farrell and Saloner (1992) and Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992) , and different from the homogenous products model of Katz and Shapiro (1985) . I focus on incentives for unilateral action on compatibility (e.g., in the case of user-positive effects, developing an adapter), rather than joint action (e.g., developing a standard). I also restrict attention to a static environment (i.e., a single-period model). My findings for user-positive effects essentially replicate the results of Katz and Shapiro (1985) concerning the relationship of firm size to compatibility incentives. But my findings for nonuser-negative effects do not bear out the intuition about excessive incentives. Instead, I find incentives for incompatibility that follow closely, though not exactly, Katz and Shapiro's results relating optimality of firms' incentives to network size: whereas firms that are close in size tend to have socially excessive incentives for incompatibility, an imposing firm has insufficient incentives for incompatibility if its "network" (customer base) is relatively very small or very large.
The next section lays out the general model. Section 3 derives welfare results for the user-positive case. Section 4 derives welfare results for the nonuser-negative case. Section 5 offers a public policy discussion and concludes.
A Model of Differentiated Product Duopoly with Network Effects
Consider a market for two products, A and B, sold at prices p A and p B , respectively. Consumers are distributed uniformly on a unit segment based on their preferences for A versus B, with the total number of consumers normalized to 1. There are no outside goods: consumers choose whether to purchase A or B, and each consumer will choose at most one unit of one of the two products. I posit a general framework of network effects as given by the following utility functions, representing the utility that the consumer located at a point j (1≥ j ≥0) obtains from purchasing a unit of product A or B, respectively:
Here, v represents the demand for all products; θ, which may be positive or negative, parameterizes the demand for A relative to B; t represents the intensity of consumers' relative preferences for A or B (t > 0); Q i is the number of consumers who purchase product i (i = A, B); λ parameterizes the overall size of the network effect (λ Katz and Shapiro's (1985) parlance, that the compatibility technology is an "adapter," hence A and B are compatible if A unilaterally decides to undertake the expense to make them compatible. Note that the decision to make firm B's consumers compatible also means that firm A's consumers are compatible with firm B's, so that B's consumers receive increased network benefits as well; that is, the benefits are mutual. Since my purpose is to examine whether the level of compatibility chosen by a firm of a given network size is too high or too low, I assume without loss of generality that only A makes the decision of whether to make the products compatible.
The second case involves a nonuser-negative effect: firm A considers the possibility of imposing a negative externality that only affects the users of product B. I will show that the effect of doing this is also to create a network externality: when λ > 0, the reservation price of users of A increases with the number of users of A, all else equal (Note 6). Obviously, A's decision to make B's users more incompatible with product A does not have a mutual effect: A's users are not reciprocally harmed by users of B. That is, B is made more incompatible with A, but A is not made more incompatible with B.
The relative private and social incentives for compatibility in this case might seem obvious. As discussed in the introduction, since the incompatibility decision involves a unilaterally imposed negative externality, the incompatibility incentives of firm A would seem always to be excessive, unlike in the case of user-positive effects. The model considers whether that expectation is correct.
Equilibrium with User-Positive Effects
Setting parameters to the values proposed for case (I) above, (1) and (2) become:
Assume v is large enough that all consumers choose A or B at equilibrium prices, implying
. Combining (3) and (4) reveals that the consumer at j prefers A over B if
may be viewed as the consumer's reservation price for A relative to B. It is interesting also to note that the relative quantity of A versus B matters more to the relative willingness-to-pay the less compatible the two products are.
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985) , we assume that firm A incurs a fixed cost of compatibility, ( ) X C σ λ . This is assumed to depend upon the size of the compatibility benefit received by its users from each incremental user of B, and which B's users receive in turn from the incremental user of A. For simplicity, assume
while firm B sets B p to maximize
I restrict attention to t λ < , which is required for a stable interior solution; otherwise a small exogenous shift of consumers between products results, through the network effect, in all consumers shifting. Assuming such a solution, using (5), and making appropriate substitutions, 
The 
while the first-order condition for firm B's problem is
It is immediately clear from (11) Solving (10) and (12) together yields ( )
and ( )
Hence, consistent with Farrell and Saloner (1992) , compatibility implies higher prices. Incentives to cut price to achieve greater sales through enlargement of the own-product-specific network effect are diminished the more compatible the products are. Substituting (13) and (14) into (8) provides a useful partial-reduced-form for
Solving (11) explicitly for ( )
As we demonstrate in the appendix, the values of * X σ that correspond to both roots are maxima. It is not necessary to our welfare results to determine which value of * X σ is preferred by firm A; we are able to proceed with (16). Substituting (16) into (13) and (14) , 1 1 8 , 1 1 8
Thus, in my simple model, firm A uses compatibility over the range of an interior solution as a "buffer" to keep A Q at an optimizing level that is independent of θ . A lower level of demand will cause A to set X σ and A p higher (hence, B p will be higher as well -recall that prices rise with compatibility), keeping A Q steady at the level given in (18). Meanwhile, when demand is high enough or low enough to correspond to a corner solution with respect to compatibility, firm A does not buffer its output. Equation (16) We now turn to the question of how the level of compatibility chosen by firm A relates to the social optimum. Define welfare as
Making substitutions from the model and differentiating with respect to X σ , I obtain the following result:
PROPOSITION 1: Unless the costs of compatibility are very large, when the firms are the same or close to the same size, the unilateral private incentives for each firm with respect to compatibility are too low. When the firms are not close in size, the smaller firm has socially excessive incentives to seek compatibility unilaterally.
The proposition is essentially consistent with the findings of Katz and Shapiro (1985) that firms with large networks or good reputations are biased against compatibility, whereas those with small networks or weak reputations are biased in favor of it.
Equilibrium with Nonuser-Negative Effects
Now let us set parameters to the values proposed for case (II).
(1) and (2) become:
Again assume v large enough that all consumers choose A or B at equilibrium prices (Note 9). Combining (20) and (21) 
while, as in the previous case, firm B sets p B to maximize (7).
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International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 7, No. 6; 2015 6 Assuming an interior solution, using (22), and making appropriate substitutions, Solving (26) and (28) Comparing (29) and (30) to (13) and (14), one is struck by the similarity of the equations. With X σ set to zero, the equations are identical, but for the coefficients on * λ . Thus, in the current case, we obtain a pricing result that is the precise flipside to the result in the previous case: incompatibility implies lower prices. In both the user-positive and nonuser-negative cases, the price effect is proportional to the size of the network effect.
However, if one compares the price differential in the current case with the differential in the previous case, an important difference emerges. With user-positive effects, the price differential between the products is independent of the network effect. This follows naturally from the mutuality of the effect. But with nonuser-negative effects, the price premium for product A increases with the network effect. Because this case involves a negative externality imposed unidirectionally, the "victimized" product, B, is in effect degraded relative to imposing product A.
Turning to the determination of equilibrium outcomes, substitution of (29) and (30) into (24) obtains
and substituting this into (27) yields
Note that an interior solution in quantities requires 2t λ < , hence 
where, using (31), 
As in the case of user-positive effects, I obtain a "buffering" result, that is, Firm A sets λ as a buffer to keep 
Differentiating with respect to λ, we obtain the following result:
International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 7, No. 6; 2015 8 PROPOSITION 2: When the imposing firm is small relative to its competitor, or when it is relatively large and the costs of incompatibility are large but not prohibitive, its incentives for incompatibility may be too low. When the imposing firm and its competitor are close in size, its incentives for incompatibility are too high, except when the costs of incompatibility are relatively large, in which case social and private incentives conform for zero incompatibility (i.e., perfect compatibility). Table 1 summarizes more specifically the social optimality outcomes with respect to firm A's incompatibility decision in terms of the incompatibility cost parameter, k, and relative demand parameter. θ. Parametric regions corresponding to incentives for incompatibility being too low are displayed in blue; regions in which incompatibility is too high are displayed in red. As with Proposition 2, the results are derived in the appendix.
The intuition of the results for nonuser-negative effects can be seen from the car and sport-utility vehicle case example. When demands for cars and SUVs are relatively close in size, the SUV manufacturer's incentives for incompatibility may be excessive. Making SUVs more hazardous to car drivers provides maximum benefit to the SUV manufacturer when the network sizes for the two vehicle types are near equal because the effect on SUV sales at the margin is greatest. However, the social cost of vehicle incompatibility is also highest in this situation, since the probability of deadly car versus SUV accidents is greatest when cars and SUVs coexist on the road in near equal numbers (White, 2004) .
Meanwhile, when SUVs significantly outnumber cars, the manufacturer's incentives for incompatibility may be too low. This is because manufacturers fail to account for the social benefit that SUV-imposed external costs have of increasing homogeneity of the product mix, so that the incidence of car versus SUV accidents is reduced. Similarly, SUV firms' incentives for incompatibility are too low when cars significantly outnumber SUVs. In this situation, the increase in the price differential between SUVs and cars has a negative effect on SUV sales that outstrips the positive network effect. So, though SUVs are made more dangerous, the number of SUVs declines sufficiently to increase welfare overall. In both cases of lopsided network size, the manufacturer considers mainly the marginal effect of incompatibility on his sales, and this is smaller the more lopsided the network sizes are.
Though not exact, there is a strong correspondence between the results we obtained with respect to user-positive effects and those that arise under nonuser-negative effects. The clearest correspondence exists for firms with relatively low demand (i.e., small networks). I observe under nonuser-negative effects that such firms have suboptimal incentives for incompatibility from a social welfare perspective, just as firms with small networks had excessive incentives for compatibility under user-positive effects. When the two firms are close in size, the results also conform in most cases. When Thus, under nonuser-negative effects, a firm's incentives for incompatibility may be excessive for moderate levels of relative demand, so long as the costs of incompatibility are not too large. This corresponds to the case of moderate demand under user-positive effects, in which private incentives for compatibility are too low.
Interestingly, with respect to firms with large networks, my results for the nonuser-negative case differ from Katz and Shapiro's (1985) findings for the user-positive case. While Katz and Shapiro find that firms with large networks or good reputations tend to be biased against compatibility, I find that they might be biased against incompatibility. Specifically, for ( ) 
Conclusion
Previous analyses of incentives for compatibility in the context of network effects have focused on the case of user-positive effects. By and large, the results of these studies have suggested that firms focus primarily on compatibility as a tool to win over marginal customers, and they tend correspondingly to undervalue the utility that inframarginal customers gain from having a product that is compatible with products used by others. Thus, firms with large or moderate market shares, who have therefore a greater ratio of inframarginal to marginal consumers, tend to undervalue compatibility. Meanwhile, firms with small market shares place too much emphasis on it.
This paper has shown that a similar pattern of compatibility preferences relative to the social optimum exists for small and mid-sized firms under nonuser-negative effects. As in the user-positive case, the result relates to firms' incentives to win consumers at the margin; however, because the mechanism of the network effect is different in the nonuser-negative case, so is the logic of the result. Nonuser-negative effects result from negative externalities that users impose on nonusers, thus both their value to the imposing firm and their adverse social effects are stronger the more "contact points" there are between users and nonusers. For this reason, firms' incentives for incompatibility tend to be excessive when market shares are near-equal. Correspondingly, when a firm has a small market share, the number of contact points with nonusers is diminished because the firm has a smaller installed base. This decreases its incentives for incompatibility. Meanwhile, the adverse social effects of incompatibility are also decreased, while the social benefit that increased incompatibility has through its ability www.ccsenet.org/ijef
International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 7, No. 6; 2015 to shift consumers and increase homogeneity in the product mix becomes relatively prominent. The result is that a firm's incentives for incompatibility may be too low when its market share is small.
The paper has further indicated that, with respect to firms with large market shares, the social optimality of firms' compatibility incentives may differ in the nonuser-negative case relative to the user-positive case. Indeed, the same mechanism is at work for large and small firms under nonuser-negative effects: private benefits to incompatibility are diminished when firm sizes are lopsided, but social benefits are increased. This represents a difference relative to the conventional, user-positive case.
The general implication is that public policy has a role in encouraging compatibility when competing products have near-equal network sizes. This is true not only in the case of user-positive effects, but also when external costs are imposed selectively by users on non-users. Conversely, policy makers may need to dampen unilateral private incentives for compatibility at the margin when network sizes are lopsided. The surprising thing is that this may actually mean encouraging firms to impose larger external costs that selectively affect rivals' products. For example, if SUVs represented a small enough share of the motor vehicle market, it might actually improve welfare to make them more hazardous to car drivers, because the price effects of doing would further curtail sales of SUVs. If instead the overwhelming majority of vehicles were SUVs, making them more hazardous would again improve welfare-in this case, by reducing further the number of car drivers that incur incompatibility losses due to SUVs. In both situations, increased incompatibility at a per-unit level improves welfare by increasing standardization and thereby reducing the adverse effects of incompatibility at an aggregate level.
Beyond pure compatibility considerations, the broader implications of my results for public policy are perhaps equally surprising. The wisdom that external costs are provided excessively in the market and should be reduced is called into question when one considers that, in many cases, such costs have implications for the competitive equilibrium in markets (Note 11). Situations involving user-imposed externalities should be scrutinized to consider whether the externalities selectively, or asymmetrically, affect non-users (i.e., are nonuser-negative).
The desirability of certain policy prescriptions, such as the use of Pigouvian taxes, might be affected by such asymmetries.
Note 5. External costs can often be manipulated through product design. SUVs generally have high, stiff front ends, and this increases the damage done to vehicles with which they collide; these effects could be undone through various design changes (Bradsher, 2002; Latin & Kasolas, 2002) . Cigarettes could be manufactured to give off more or less smoke from the lit end, and the amount of smoke and noise emitted by gasoline-powered outdoor equipment could similarly be altered by design. Meanwhile, the size of the external costs that consumers perceive might be manipulated using marketing messages. For instance, calling greater attention to how imposing a particular SUV is might convince consumers that it is more dangerous to other motorists. (See Bradsher (2002) for examples of intimidating SUV advertisements.) By advertising, "Don't be the last programmer in the market to get one," a purveyor of computer programming certifications might enlarge perceptions of the stigma imposed on non-adopters by incremental adoptions. Note 10. Nagler (2011) assumes a convex cost of incompatibility, with a linear, increasing marginal cost to enlarging the negative externality. The structure used here simplifies the equilibrium solution, but does not have a significant impact on the main results.
Note 11. This issue is explored directly by Nagler (2011) .
Appendix A Second Order Conditions-Positive Consumption Externalities Case
The Hessian in this case is given by
where, using (8), (13), (14), and the first-order condition
= , the components are given by
1 2 
So all solutions to the first-order conditions are maxima.
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Differentiate (46) with respect to σ X , use (13) and (15), and assume an interior solution: Thus, whenever firm A's network size is small enough that it chooses at least partial compatibility, it overinvests in compatibility. 
